Measuring the Relationship Between Resources and Outcomes in Higher Education in Norway by Try, Sverre & Grøgaard, Jens B.
Sverre Try and Jens B. Grøgaard 
 
Measuring the Relationship Between Resources and 
Outcomes in Higher Education in Norway 
 
NIFU skriftserie nr. 27/2003 
 
NIFU – Norsk institutt for studier 
av forskning og utdanning 
Hegdehaugsveien 31 
0352 Oslo 
 
ISSN 0808-4572 
NIFU skriftserie nr. 27/2003 – Measuring the Relationship Between Resources and Outcomes in Higher Education in Norway 
 
 
 2 
NIFU skriftserie nr. 27/2003 – Measuring the Relationship Between Resources and Outcomes in Higher Education in Norway 
Preface 
This report is an extended version of a paper presented at the 11th Transition in Youth (TIY) 
Conference in Funchal, Madeira 4.-6. September 2003 (“Competences and Careers”). 
 
The objective of the report is to analyse the connection between the allocation of resources in 
higher education and the subsequent effects on graduates’ labour market outcome. The 
analyses are based on data from different sources matched for the first time. Graduate level 
data are derived from The NIFU Graduate Survey 2000 while the faculty level data are either 
from registers or from NIFU University Survey 2000. 
 
The research was supported by The Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research. 
 
The report is written by Sverre Try and Jens B. Grøgaard. Pål Børing, Lars Nerdrum, Bjarne 
Strøm and participants at the TIY-Network have commented on earlier drafts. 
 
 
 
Oslo, November 2003 
 
Petter Aasen 
Director 
Lars Nerdrum 
Research Director 
 3
NIFU skriftserie nr. 27/2003 – Measuring the Relationship Between Resources and Outcomes in Higher Education in Norway 
 
 
 4 
NIFU skriftserie nr. 27/2003 – Measuring the Relationship Between Resources and Outcomes in Higher Education in Norway 
Contents 
Summary ..............................................................................................................................7 
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................8 
2 Previous Research ......................................................................................................10 
3 Methodology................................................................................................................12 
4 Data..............................................................................................................................15 
5 Results..........................................................................................................................19 
5.1 Analysis of Variance .............................................................................................19 
5.2 Structural Fixed-Effect Models .............................................................................20 
5.3 Alternative Estimation Procedures and Model Specifications of the Fixed-Effect 
Model ....................................................................................................................23 
5.3.1 Comparison Between Individual Level and Multilevel Analyses ...............23 
5.3.2 Fixed-Effect Models Excluding Academic Performance ............................24 
5.3.3 Fixed-Effect Models with Job-Characteristics ............................................24 
5.4 Random Coefficient Models .................................................................................25 
6 Discussion and conclusions ........................................................................................31 
References ..........................................................................................................................34 
Appendix ............................................................................................................................37 
 
 5
NIFU skriftserie nr. 27/2003 – Measuring the Relationship Between Resources and Outcomes in Higher Education in Norway 
 
 
 
 6 
NIFU skriftserie nr. 27/2003 – Measuring the Relationship Between Resources and Outcomes in Higher Education in Norway 
Summary 
The paper estimates the gross effects of educational resources in the Norwegian university 
sector on the subsequent labour market outcome of recent graduates. Society spends an 
increasing amount of money on higher education, and a growing proportion of the population 
enters higher education. The increased financial and human investments in higher education 
require more insight into the use of resources and the outcome of the investments. 
 
Objective and subjective indicators of institutional resources are measured by student 
composition, financial and staff resources and staffs’ priorities. Graduates’ outcome in the 
labour market is measured by job probability, skills mismatch and initial wages. The analysis is 
based on hierarchical linear modelling (HLM). 
 
The results show that student composition matters: the most selective faculties reduce skills 
mismatch and increase wages. Wage-models show that the most selective faculties are also 
most equitable across age-cohorts, and that the effect of academic performance is not uniform 
for graduates from different faculties. We do not find significant effects of financial or staff 
resources or staffs’ priorities.  
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1 Introduction 
Institutions of higher education (HE) are expected to serve society with a variety of functions, 
assessed by cultural, political, economic, social as well as moral standards. One primary task of 
HE is to serve society with particular skills and knowledge. Phrased in economic terms, two 
narrow but important goals are to produce graduates and to produce research output. This 
paper focuses on the first of these goals, and it does so by investigating the production function 
relationship between the allocation of resources in HE and the labour market outcomes for HE 
graduates in Norway in 2000. The use of resources is indicated by traditional measures as 
expenditure per student, the student-staff ratio and the number of applicants per admitted 
student (intake selectivity score). These three measures capture the distribution of financial 
resources, staff resources and student input resources between faculties. The resource 
indicators are supplemented with subjective judgements of the resource situation, as assessed 
from the academic staffs’ point of view. The combination of objective and subjective measures 
of resources is quite unique to this study. The outcome of the university-to-work transition is 
indicated by three measures; the employment probability, the incidence of overeducation and 
the initial wages. These output measures focus on the relevance of education to the labour 
market, and goes beyond many HE-studies that concentrate on effects within the educational 
system itself, as for instance the flow of students, satisfaction scores and educational gains (e.g. 
Hu & Kuh 2000, Toutkoushian & Smart 2001). 
 
Questions related to the issue of the connection between resources and returns in HE have 
become relevant for several reasons. A growing proportion of the population enters HE. At 
present more than 50% of each cohort in Norway is expected to undertake some kind of HE 
before the age of 35 (Næss 2000) and the Norwegian society spends more money on education 
than on the health services (Try & Aamodt 2000). This also means that society may face the 
possibility of a spiralling growth in educational costs without concomitant increases in quality. 
In addition this volume of students represents human resources that obviously have several 
alternative uses in the labour market. From a political point of view, the increased financial and 
human investments in HE pinpoints the need of acquiring increased insight into the spending 
of resources as well as to obtain knowledge about the results of these investments. 
 
The financing and organizational framework of Norwegian HE is centralized. The university 
sector is public and financed through the state budget, and there are basically no tuition fees. 
Even though parts of the educational system are highly selective, the effort to obtain equality 
of opportunity and standardisation of evaluation regimes constitute important characteristics of 
the system. Most subject fields impose national standards of student assessments through a 
body of examiners who are external to the institution. It is of interest to investigate to what 
extent the graduates' labour market returns correspond to the educational resources within this 
regulated system. Recent reforms in Norwegian HE have brought into focus how institutions 
use their resources, and current changes amplify the importance of using quantitative measures 
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of institutional performance to monitor and evaluate the sector. Determining whether 
institutional characteristics influence student gains is therefore of urgent interest. 
 
The hypothesis is that educational resources have a positive impact on graduates’ labour 
market outcome, but former international studies have not succeeded in strongly and 
consistently confirming such a relationship. There may be several reasons for this. First, many 
studies cover primary and secondary education and only a few relates to HE. There is a huge 
time span from primary and secondary education input to subsequent outcomes for adult 
employees. Several intermediate factors and mediating effects may obscure the relationship. 
Pupils at the lower levels of education, for example, will often move between different schools 
and participate in continuing education to a varying degree. Second, many studies focus on 
long term earning effects. But workers may receive training beyond school, for example in-
plant training, and vocational or general training at work may compensate for or support the 
impact of formal education. Third, many studies are marked by inadequate sets of data and the 
resource indicators are often rough. In this study, we avoid the first two limitations by focusing 
on short term labour market outcomes among HE graduates. By combining resource measures 
from different data sources, we will confront the third point directly.  
 
Three main questions will be raised in this paper: First, to what extent can institutions of HE 
explain graduates’ labour market outcome? Second, how do possible institutional effects work, 
and especially to what extent can subjective assessments of the resource situation from the 
university staff contribute to further evidence, as compared to the explanatory power of the 
traditional objective resource measures? Third, we want to investigate the interplay between 
institutional and individual effects. The paper is arranged as follows: The next section 
describes earlier research, part 3 outlines the methods briefly while part 4 describes the data. 
The data description is rather detailed, because we use data sets that are unknown to most 
people and because we introduce new resource variables. Part 5 shows the empirical results 
and part 6 concludes. 
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2 Previous Research 
A large part of the research within this field is carried out in the USA, and many studies are 
directed towards lower levels of education. Hanushek (1997) sums up this research and 
concludes that no strong and consistent connection exists between school resources and pupil 
outcome. Hanushek’s interpretation of this result is that in many ways the school’s use of 
resources is inefficient, and that more knowledge is needed about the use of resources. Upon 
re-estimating Hanushek’s material, others have concluded that allocation of resources is indeed 
of importance to the quality of the schools (e.g. Krueger 2003). 
 
Reviews of the more limited number of studies of HE within this field often conclude in 
concord with Hanushek. Astin (1991) sums up earlier research by claiming that there is no 
systematic connection between institutional factors and the students’ returns. Pascarella & 
Terenzini's (1991) overall conclusion is that institutional characteristics are not linked with 
major differences in net impacts on students, apart from a moderate impact of selectivity on 
earnings. 
 
Several studies have supplemented the picture in recent years. Rumberger & Thomas (1993) 
investigate the relationship between an institutions’ selectivity, college major and educational 
performance (measured by self-reported college grades) on the one hand and recent graduates’ 
earnings on the other hand. They find that initial earnings are influenced by all three qualitative 
factors, and such factors will also be included in the present study.  
The positive relationship between selectivity and earnings, in the sense that those institutions 
having the most restrictive intake regime contributes to the highest returns, is also found by 
James et al. (1993). Expenditures per student, on the other hand, have no such impact. The 
relationship between selectivity and subsequent earnings is also confirmed by Fox (1993), 
Loury & Garman (1995) and Thomas (2003). Many related US studies focus on the question 
whether it is profitable to be educated at the expensive – but prestigious – universities (Brewer 
& Ehrenberg 1996; Eide et al. 1998; Brewer et al. 1999). This question is tied up to particular 
features of the US educational system with large variation in tuition fees, and is only to a less 
extent applicable to Norwegian conditions characterised with a public HE system without such 
fees. 
 
Robst (1995) examines the relationship between college quality and skill mismatch, and finds 
negative effects of three different college quality measures (intake selectivity, expenditure per 
student and prestige rating) on the likelihood of being overeducated. Hu & Kuh (2000) test a 
learning production function where subjective and objective institutional measures are used to 
explain student learning. They find that the subjective measures are better predictors than the 
objective institutional characteristics. The subjective measures are constructed from students’ 
assessment of aspects of college environment. Toutkoushian & Smart (2001) find that 
expenditure per student and selectivity are positively related to the students’ self-perceived 
educational gains. However, they report no clear evidence of the impact of student-staff ratios. 
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Recent European studies include Bosker et al. (2001), who find systematic institutional effect – 
although rather weak – with respect to labour market outcomes both regarding job entry, skill-
match and wages in Holland. In a study from UK, Belfield & Fielding (2001) find positive 
basic correlations between expenditure per student or student-staff ratios and graduates’ 
subsequent earnings, but these correlations are significantly reduced and no substantively 
significant results are found when other controlling factors are included. 
 
All in all, previous research shows ambiguous results. No clear conclusions can be drawn, 
although the evidences concerning the impact of resources related to the composition of the 
student body (selectivity) seem to be more convincing than the evidence concerning the impact 
of financial or staff resources. 1 
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1  Selectivity may produce a motivation effect among the admitted students which partly compensates for other 
weaknesses of the institution related to the social climate, the quality of teaching and instruction, teaching 
facilities, etc. The motivation caused by the knowledge of being among the chosen ones (the selected) 
increases the level of overall satisfaction among Norwegian students (Wiers-Jenssen et al. 2002). This 
normally leads to self-confidence, stronger efforts, endurance and better results (Bandura 1977). 
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3 Methodology 
The question in focus is related to how differences in resources may contribute to explaining 
variations in the graduates’ labour market returns. These returns can be tied to individual 
factors like the human capital level as well as to demography and to institutional factors like 
resources. Graduates may also be affected by grouping effects at the institutional level. This 
means that groups of students are nested within institutional units. Thus, students are neither 
statistically nor substantially independent from each other. One method of dealing with such 
data structures is provided by multilevel model analysis.  
 
Three important arguments for using this approach can be mentioned briefly.2 First, the multi-
level model handles the problem of dependency of observations. This problem arises when 
graduates from one institution are more closely resembled with each other than with graduates 
from other institutions. Second, this technique takes account of the fact that there are different 
numbers of observations at the two levels respectively. In our case, the number of graduates is 
much larger than the number of institutions. The multilevel model includes the proper sample 
size in the statistical tests at each level simultaneously. Third, the model treats each level 
explicitly, making it easier to interpret the effects of each level. If the model structure is 
presented without consideration to the nested structure of observations, one may easily analyse 
the data at one level and draw conclusions at another level. In the literature this is referred to as 
“the fallacy of the wrong level”. Previous research on school resources that have used 
multilevel analysis includes Rumberger & Thomas (1993), Hu & Kuh (2000), Bosker et al. 
(2001), Belfield & Fielding (2001) and Thomas (2003).  
 
Let Yij represent the dependent variable measuring labour market outcome for individual i in 
institution j. This is a 2-level nested structure, where level 1 refers to the individual level and 
level 2 to the institutional level. The model can be presented in the following simple form: 
 
(1)  Yij = F(α1j + β1jXij) 
(2)  α1j = α2 + β2 Zj + ε2j 
(3a)  β1j = γ 
 
Xij represents the individual variables of graduate i in institution j; Zj is the institutional 
variables for institution j; α1j and α2 are intercepts at level 1 and 2 respectively; β1 and β2 are 
the coefficients describing the relationships between the variables at level 1 respectively level 2 
and the labour market outcome. Equation (1) describes a structural model at level 1 where the 
relationship between individual factors and outcomes are supplemented with an institution-
specific intercept. Equation (2) is a structural model at level 2 explaining the intercept as a 
function of a mean intercept across all institutions plus the effect of institutional attributes and  
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2  We will not describe multilevel models in detail, but refer the interested reader to more thorough 
introductions like Goldstein (1995), Hox (1995), Snijders & Bosker (1999) or Raudenbush & Bryk (2002). 
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an error term ε2j at level 2. This second level intercept is assumed to have mean 0 and constant 
variance. The specification of the error term at level 1 depends on the link function F(η). In the 
wage-level models, the linear identity link function is specified: 
 
(4)  F(η) = η + ε1ij  
 
where η = α1j + β1Xij and ε1ij are the error term at level 1, assumed to have mean 0 and constant 
variance. Models predicting the probabilities of job or overeducation use the logit link function 
to ensure that the predictions are constrained within the interval (0,1): 
 
(5)   F(η) = log [ 1 / {1+exp(-η) } ] 
 
As a starting point equation (3a) specifies the regression slopes at level one as fixed. To extend 
to the model above, random slopes for chosen first-level variables are introduced in order to 
investigate whether the effects of these variables vary across institutions: 
 
(3b)  β1j = γ + µj 
 
As a final expansion of the model, institutional factors are included in order to explain 
variation across institutions in equation (3c): 
 
(3c)  β1j = γ + δ Zj + µj 
 
Institutional variables explaining the slopes of individual effects generate interaction terms 
between the first and the second-level variables. Only significant institutional variables from 
the previous steps are retained in this final model. Models employing relation (3a) is referred to 
as fixed-effect models, and those using (3b) or (3c) are called random-coefficient models.3 
 
The models assume that labour market outcomes are a function of the individual and 
educational background characteristics. Job-specific variables like sector, industry, occupation, 
firm- size, etc. are not included in the models predicting overeducation or wages. The 
assumption underlying this choice of model specification is that all job-related variables are 
regarded as outcome variables, and such variables should not be held constant in the model 
(Belfield & Fielding 2001). Our task is not to disentangle all the job-specific elements that may 
explain mismatches or wages within a certain job, but to estimate gross effects of educational 
resource variables. In section 5.3.3 we will discuss this question in further detail and show the 
implication of including job characteristics in the estimations.  
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3  Parameters are estimated by HLM5, using full maximum-likelihood estimation in the wage model and 
penalized quasi-likelihood estimation in the logit models. 
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The institutional unit of the analysis is faculty, which is an administrative unit of departments 
within a university, and Z represents resource variables at the faculty level. The faculty level is 
further described and discussed in the next section.  
 
Resources are also indirectly related to subject field through the national finance model, and 
graduates are clustered in subjects as well as in faculties. This structure could invite to the 
addition of subjects as a third level of the hierarchical model. Faculties, however, are not 
clustered into subjects or vice versa. The relation between faculties and subjects are complex in 
the HE system of Norway, blurring the nested structure. Thus, we chose to include major 
subjects among the personal attributes X in the analyses as a measure of educational experience 
and individual credentials, in line with other studies in this area (Thomas 2003). 
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4 Data 
Individual data are drawn from the NIFU Graduate Survey 2000. This survey comprises 
university graduates with four to six years of HE. The respondents graduated in the spring 
terms and were followed up by a questionnaire half a year later, when most of them had 
entered the labour market. Graduates from the four Norwegian general universities and from 
three specialised universities are included in the analysis in this paper. The three specialised 
universities are Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Agricultural 
University of Norway and The Norwegian School of Veterinary Science. The overall response 
rate is 70%. 
 
The study focuses on the university-to-work process. For that reason, graduates who continued 
to study and who did not search for a job are excluded from the data set. The proportion of 
excluded respondents is 4% (79 persons) of the initial sample, leaving us with a final sample of 
1887 graduates nested within 34 faculties.  
 
Table A1 in the Appendix shows the distribution of dependent and independent variables used 
in the analysis. Three different measures of the short term job outcome are included: the job 
probability, the probability of overeducation and the wage level.4 In the sample, 90% are 
employed at the time of the interview. Among those employed, 19% state that they have more 
education than their job requires. This measure for overeducation is a subjective assessment of 
skills mismatch.5 Among full-time wage earners, the monthly wage is NOK 23 083 or 2885 €.6 
The wage models uses log-wage as the dependent variable in order to make it invariant to 
exchange rates and inflation. 
 
Demographic variables include gender, age and family situation by indicators for married or 
cohabitant graduates and responsibility for children. These variables indicate the degree of 
economic dependency, and may affect both the graduates’ reservation wage and their job 
probability. Children may affect men and women differently, and this will be accounted for by 
an interaction term. Social background is measured by parents’ educational level. In addition, 
an indicator for non-western immigrants is included in the model. 
 
                                                 
4  For the analyses of job entry, the total sample is used. For the overeducation analyses, the sample is restricted 
to those graduates who held a job at the time of the survey, amounting to 1707 cases. For the wage analyses, 
the sample is restricted to full-time wage earners, amounting to 1294 cases. 
5  Other methods used to determine the mismatch between the skills workers possess and the skills their jobs 
requires are the objective method based on some independent assessment of skill requirement or the 
comparative method where the education levels of current job holders are compared with those of other 
current or past job holders. Each method has limitations but all has been used in past research (Hartog 2000, 
Borghans & de Grip 2000). 
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6  Wages are measured as monthly earnings before tax, not including overtime or extra income. Part-time 
workers are excluded from the wage analysis because it is not possible to convert monthly income to hourly 
wages. Self-employed are excluded because their income may include returns to capital investment and since 
unmeasured variation in working time complicates the comparisons. 
NIFU skriftserie nr. 27/2003 – Measuring the Relationship Between Resources and Outcomes in Higher Education in Norway 
The dispersion of education and work experience in years is limited in the sample, as all 
respondents are university graduates with a final degree. For this reason, we diverge from the 
Mincerian measure of experience and education in years, and only include dummy indicators 
for those who have earlier work experience (of at least three months duration) or tertiary 
education additional to the education included in the degree in question.  
 
The graduates are grouped in seven main subject fields. The normed duration of the different 
subjects varies by a few years, even though all subjects lead to a major degree. The business 
administration (B&A) study is the shortest, requiring 4 years of tertiary study, while the other 
subjects generally requires between 5 years of study (natural sciences, primary industry 
sciences and most of the health care sciences) and 6 years of study (law and most fields within 
humanities and social sciences).7 Natural science is the largest group in the sample and B&A is 
the smallest. 
 
In addition to field of study, we separate the human-capital level by achieved grade level 
(marks), as a measure of academic performance. Most graduates in the sample received grades 
within the range of 1.0 and 4.0, with 1.0 as the best grade level. Nevertheless, grades across 
subject fields are not a standardised measure. Grades vary systematically from subject to 
subject. For instance, the average grade level of 2.2 is an outstanding grade in law, but a rather 
poor grade in the natural sciences. For this reason, grades are normalised within subject fields 
with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.8 In addition, the scale is inverted. Thus, the better the 
grade level, the higher is the value of the z-score. The grade level is unknown for 2% of the 
sample, and their z-score is set to the average 0 in the analyses. It could be discussed whether 
academic performance should be treated as a dependent or independent variable in the 
analyses. One important reason for including academic performance among the independent 
variables is that we want to investigate the connection between institutional factors and 
individual performance. In addition, the inclusion of academic performance may compensate 
for the lack of intake ability scores, because of the high correlation between intake and 
outcome scores (Baird 1985, Anaya 1999). We will discuss this question in further detail in 
section 5.3.2. 
 
The unit of analyses at institutional level is the faculty. Faculty is an administrative unit for 
different departments covering specific disciplines (e.g. sociology) within a broader academic 
field (e.g. the social sciences). This is the central unit in the national HE finance model in 
Norway at the time of the surveys, with lump-sum allocation from the state to the universities 
followed by target figures on student and graduate numbers on faculty level published in the 
state budget.9 Student mobility is also large within each faculty, and students generally 
                                                 
7  The health care sciences include pharmacy, dental studies and veterinary medicine, but do not include 
general medicine. 
8  For those graduates that follow other grade level systems than 1.0-4.0, we have normalised within the system. 
After normalisation, we find no indication of different grade regimes across institutions (Try 2000). A 
national grade level system within subjects is maintained by the external examiners. 
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9  The national finance model of HE is changed from 2003, as a part of the “Quality of HE – reform”. 
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compose a university degree containing subjects from different departments within the same 
faculty. Faculties thus seem to be the most relevant institutional unit to focus on, both seen 
from the graduates' as well as the resource point of view. 
 
Faculty level characteristics are either collected from registers or from the NIFU University 
Survey 2000 (Table A1). The latter is a questionnaire study among all faculty members of the 
rank of assistant professor or higher at the same universities as above. The response rate is 
60%. There has been a slightly declining response rate over time in these types of studies, 
partly reflecting a general overload of surveys of different kinds. Compared to international 
studies, the response rate is acceptable (e.g. Altbach 1996). 
 
The three objective resource measures are the student-staff ratio, selectivity and expenditure-
per-student. Student-staff ratio is defined as the %-share of registered students per academic 
staff members of the rank of assistant professor or higher. This is a relative measure of student 
crowd or teaching load per staff member. Selectivity relates to the admission of students and is 
defined as the ratio between the number of applicants and the number of admitted students at 
each faculty. The more applicants behind each admitted student the more popular is the faculty, 
and selectivity is thus a measure of the excess in student demand. In this paper selectivity is 
used as an imperfect indicator of initial student body quality. However, high quality studies 
may have lower scores on this particular selectivity measure than the most popular subject 
fields have at the time, because of self-selection of applicants to studies with strict admission 
demands. 
 
Expenditure-per-student covers spending on wages and operating costs per registered student. 
This is a problematic measure for several reasons. One problem is related to the large 
variations in operating costs between disciplines due to different teaching requirements. For 
example, equipment related to teaching in health care sciences like veterinary science or 
dentistry is much more expensive than equipment generally required within traditional 
academic subjects like humanities or social sciences. To some extent such differences across 
subjects can be controlled for by including subject variables in the analysis, but the problem 
may still appear at a finer level. A second problem is related to how one should treat common 
costs at university level. The division between faculty costs and common costs in the 
universities accounts may be determined by institutional or organisational conditions as well as 
by arbitrary accounting practice. In the expenditure data used in this analysis, the common 
costs are divided proportionally at faculty level. The expenditure data thus deviates somewhat 
from the official numbers.10 A third problem is that expenses on research and other activities 
may obscure the actual resources used on teaching and education. 
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10  Expenditure at faculty level is derived from NIFU Database on resources and expenditures in HE. The 
expenditure in this register deviates from the official Database on HE in two respects: First, the common 
costs are proportionally distributed at faculty level according to scale of wage costs. Second, the gross figures 
from the faculties’ accounts are adjusted according to OECD (1994) in order to achieve true expenditure at 
institutional level. The expenditure-per-student variables based on the two alternative measures are highly 
correlated (r=0.92, p=0.00). We prefer the adjusted expenditure data though, because it treats the common 
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The problems related to the objective resource measures underline the importance of having 
access to alternative measures of the resource situation. The academic staff is asked to assess 
the resource situation within their department according to a panel of statements. From this 
panel, we use the aggregated answers on faculty level from the three statements that seems 
most concrete and theoretically interesting. The first statement is: “The teaching suffers from 
scarce resources”. The staff is asked to assess this measure on a 5 point scale.11 This variable 
can be interpreted as a subjective alternative to the objective expenditure-per-student variable. 
However, the correlation coefficient between the two variables (r=0.18, p=0.30) suggests no 
connection between the objective measure and the subjective assessment, supporting the view 
that the budget allocation across faculties to a large extent is based on subject-specific 
conditions. The correlation matrix between resource variables is displayed in Table A2 in the 
Appendix. 
 
The Heterogeneous student body-variable (HSB) is derived from the statement: “The teaching 
is hampered by large differences in level of knowledge among students”. This variable can be 
interpreted as an alternative to the objective selectivity measure, but with opposite sign  
(r=-0.52, p=0.00). 
 
The last variable – Uninterested staff – is derived from the statement: “Low interest/priority 
among academic staff makes an important hindrance for better teaching”. This variable has no 
direct parallel among the objective measures, but is nevertheless correlated with the student-
staff-ratio (r=0.37, p=0.03), suggesting that heavy teaching load may reduce the staffs 
commitment. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
costs thoroughly. It turns out, however, that the results of the analyses are invariant to the choice of 
expenditure measure. 
 18
11  Values for the three subjective variables are defined as follows: “Agree strongly”=2; “Agree weakly”=1; 
“Neither nor”=0; “Disagree weakly”=-1; “Disagree strongly”=-2. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Analysis of Variance 
The first step in multilevel modelling is usually to calculate the proportion of variability in the 
dependent variable that can be ascribed to the individual level and to the group level 
respectively. This is done by estimating a base model that is equivalent to a one-way random-
effect ANOVA. This model has no level-1 or level-2 predictors, equal to constraining β1=β2=0 
in our model (1)-(3a). The purpose is to estimate institutional level variance in labour market 
outcome as a proportion of total variability in the outcome variable, or the intra-class 
correlation coefficient ρ. In the wage level model with the identity link function (4), the 
decomposition of the variability within institutions or among graduates (pooling variances 
calculated within each institution) and variability due to between-institution differences is 
straightforward. Table 1 shows that 13% of the total wage variance is a function of between-
institution differences. 
 
In the logistic model case, with the job-probability or the probability of overeducation as 
dependent variables, the error term at level-1 does not appear explicit in the link function (5) 
and the within-institution variance is not directly available. There are several definitions of 
“quasi intraclass correlation coefficient” in this case, and here we take advantage of the 
property of the logistic distribution, implying a level-1 residual variance of π2/3 (Snijders & 
Bosker 1999). The “quasi intraclass correlation coefficient” can then be calculated to 7% for 
the job-probability and to 11% for the probability of overeducation. 
 
 
Table 1: Residual variance components and intraclass correlation coefficients 
 P[job] P[overeducation] ln(wage) 
Variance between graduates, σ2(ε1ij) – – 0.026 
Variance between faculty, σ2(ε2j) 0.250 0.394 0.004 
Intraclass correlation coefficient, ρ (1) 0.071 0.107 0.133 
– not available  
Note 1: The intraclass correlation coefficient for the logistic models is estimated in accordance with Snijders & 
Bosker (1999, p: 224):  ρ = σ2(ε2j) / [σ2(ε2j) + π2/3 ]. 
 
 
These results show that the labour market outcomes can mainly be explained by the 
distribution of individual attributes, suggesting that students are the primary actor in HE. A 
moderate but statistically significant part of the variance in graduates’ employment outcome is 
a function of between-institutional differences. Subsequently this variability of institutional 
means will be modelled by using alternative resource variables. 
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5.2 Structural Fixed-Effect Models 
Table 2 shows the results from the structural fixed-effect model with the objective resource 
variables included. In judging the coefficient estimates, we should keep in mind that the 
significance tests for individual level variables are conducted on the basis of the number of 
graduates, while the significance tests for faculty level data are based on the number of 
faculties. Due to the limited number of faculties (34), we will comment on faculty-level effects 
where p<0.1, while we only discuss those individual-level variables where p<0.05. 
 
Among the objective resource measures only selectivity has a significant impact, and only on 
the probability of being overeducated and on the wage level. The job-probability is not affected 
by any of the faculty variables. On the margin, increasing the selectivity score by 1 unit 
decreases the probability of overeducation with 2 percentage points from the mean and 
increases the average wage level with 2%.12 
 
Turning to the individual level data, all demographic variables have significant effect on at 
least one of the dependent variables. Female graduates without children have higher job-
probabilities (3 %-points) 13 but also higher probabilities of being overeducated (6 %-points) 
and they receive lower initial wages (-4%) compared to their male colleagues. Females with 
children have a significant and substantially lower job-probability than females without 
children, reducing the mean probability with 18 percentage points, while children have no 
effect on males. Married or cohabitant graduates have a higher job probability (3 %-points) 
than other graduates. Age is positively correlated with wages, with an estimated elasticity of 
0.29. 
 
The social background of the graduates has no effect on their labour market outcome. It is 
noteworthy that non-western immigrants have lower job-probabilities than others, reducing the 
mean probability of obtaining a job with 11 percentage points. Once non-Western immigrants 
have a job, we cannot conclude that they are overrepresented among the overeducated or that 
they receive lower wages than others. These results are in line with Støren (2002), who also 
found that non-Western-immigrants have lower job-probabilities but the same skill-usage as 
others in a study of graduates over several cohorts. One explanation could be that the non-
western graduates are a selected part of the minority population, and those who are employed 
are even more selected. 
 
                                                 
12  The quantitative effect from the logistic models is calculated on basis of the logit-value (η0) that gives the 
mean probability F(η0). In other words, the reference person has the attributes corresponding to mean 
probability through the link-function (5). In this case, the mean probability of overeducation F(η0=-
1.45)=0.19 compared to F(η0 - 0.123)=0.17. For the wage model, the quantitative effect in percent is 
100*exp(coefficient)-1, which is equal to 100*coefficient for small values. 
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13  For the job-probability, F(η0=2.197)=0.90, in this case compared to F(η0 + 0.440)=0.93. 
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Table 2: Job, overeducation and wage model estimates with objective resource measures. 
Multilevel analyses. 
          P[job] P[overeducation]       ln(wage) 
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Faculty level data:       
Intercept -1.585  2.389 -0.937 1.792 8.921*** 0.116 
Student-staff ratio 0.022 0.013 -0.008 0.012 0.000 0.001 
Selectivity 0.026 0.054 -0.123* 0.065 0.018*** 0.004 
Expenditure per student -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Graduate level data:       
Female 0.440** 0.183 0.340** 0.148 -0.036*** 0.009 
ln(age) 0.738 0.693 0.123 0.508 0.290*** 0.033 
Married/cohabitant 0.401** 0.178 -0.212 0.142 0.021* 0.009 
Children 0.305 0.394 0.211 0.286 -0.016 0.018 
Female*Children -1.243*** 0.471 -0.243 0.382 -0.017 0.025 
Mother higher education 0.069 0.188 -0.005 0.152 0.001 0.010 
Father higher education 0.142 0.185 -0.056 0.150 -0.007 0.010 
Non western immigrant -0.876** 0.412 -0.520 0.574 -0.052 0.032 
Work experience 0.826*** 0.206 -0.871*** 0.159 0.037*** 0.009 
Additional education -0.180 0.207 -0.168 0.177 0.007 0.011 
Grade level (z-score) 0.129 0.086 -0.383*** 0.070 0.026*** 0.004 
Grade level unknown -0.258 0.473 0.447 0.435 -0.028 0.031 
Social sciences 0.433 0.383 0.543* 0.321 -0.016 0.021 
Law -1.291 0.876 0.841 0.725 0.008 0.045 
Natural sciences & Technology 0.239 0.320 -0.139 0.355 0.058*** 0.021 
Health care sciences 0.326 0.477 -1.115** 0.542 0.048** 0.024 
Primary industry sciences 0.764 0.517 0.332 0.443 0.002 0.027 
Business administration 1.618** 0.732 -0.791 0.663 0.177*** 0.034 
Model statistics:       
Variance between graduates – – 0.022 
Variance between faculty 0.104 0.238*** 0.001*** 
Deviance – – -1245 
Number of graduates 1887 1707 1294 
Number of faculties 34 34 34 
Note: * p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. – not available 
 
 
Graduates with earlier work experience have significant higher job-probabilities (5 %-points), 
lower overeducation-probabilities (-10 %-points) and higher wages (4%) than others. 
Academic performance affects type of job. Increasing the grade-level z-score by 1 unit leads to 
a 5 percentage point reduction in the mean probability of overeducation and a 3% increase in 
the average wage level. Grade level has no impact on the job-probability, a result that could be 
ascribed to the boom at the time of the survey. In 2000, the economic activity was high in 
Norway, with strong demand for labour and low levels of unemployment (OECD 2001). In a 
favourable labour market like this most graduates get a job. They do, however, queue up for 
"good jobs" partly according to grades. 
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The labour market outcome is most favourable among business and administration (B&A)-
graduates. Compared to the mean, the B&A-graduates have a job probability that is 8 
percentage points higher and receive a wage level 19 percent above average. The latter result  
 
 
Table 3: Job, overeducation and wage model estimates with subjective resource measures. 
Multilevel analyses. 
          P[job] P[overeducation]       ln(wage) 
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Faculty level data:       
Intercept -1.460 2.414 -3.150* 1.844 9.033*** 0.120 
Scarce resources 0.037 0.386 -0.127 0.409 0.037 0.027 
Heterogeneous student body  -0.034 0.380 1.126** 0.437 -0.076*** 0.026 
Uninterested staff -0.243 0.596 -0.855 0.596 0.003 0.043 
Graduate level data:       
Female 0.420** 0.184 0.346** 0.148 -0.034*** 0.009 
ln(age) 0.791 0.692 0.323 0.507 0.285*** 0.033 
Married/cohabitant 0.422** 0.178 -0.198 0.142 0.020** 0.009 
Children 0.238 0.392 0.235 0.285 -0.016 0.018 
Female*Children -1.160** 0.469 -0.275 0.381 -0.019 0.025 
Mother higher education 0.073 0.188 -0.003 0.152 0.001 0.010 
Father higher education 0.139 0.185 -0.054 0.150 -0.006 0.010 
Non western immigrant -0.860** 0.412 -0.488 0.572 -0.053 0.033 
Work experience 0.826*** 0.206 -0.859*** 0.159 0.034*** 0.009 
Additional education -0.161 0.207 -0.174 0.177 0.006 0.011 
Grade level (z-score) 0.133 0.086 -0.387*** 0.070 0.027*** 0.004 
Grade level unknown -0.288 0.471 0.430 0.433 -0.018 0.031 
Social sciences 0.707* 0.403 0.640** 0.319 -0.003 0.023 
Law 0.290 0.511 1.031** 0.495 0.030 0.033 
Natural sciences & Technology 0.222 0.340 -0.273 0.323 0.106*** 0.024 
Health care sciences 0.260 0.466 -0.738 0.490 0.061** 0.027 
Primary industry sciences 0.631 0.540 0.217 0.417 0.046 0.030 
Business administration 1.945** 0.795 -0.312 0.681 0.181*** 0.044 
Model statistics:       
Variance between graduates – – 0.022 
Variance between faculty 0.160** 0.186*** 0.001*** 
Deviance – – -1232 
Number of graduates 1887 1707 1294 
Number of faculties 34 34 34 
Note: * p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. – not available 
 
 
is consistent with other studies that have examined differences in the initial and subsequent 
earnings of college graduates across majors in USA (Rumberger & Thomas 1993, Thomas 
2003). If differences in labour market prospects across subjects are lasting and well-known, 
they could influence the choices that students make when deciding what major to select in 
college. The estimated differences across subjects could therefore partly be a result of self-
selection, which is the case in all studies of these types (Thomas 2003). 
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Table 3 shows the results from the same structural multilevel models as above, but now the 
objective resource variables are substituted with the subjective indicators. Basically the effects 
of the graduate level variables are not affected by this change in the specification of the model. 
The only difference worth mentioning is the change in some of the subject-major variables 
contained in the overeducation model. Law graduates now face a significantly higher 
probability of overeducation compared to the reference group (humanities), and the health-care 
science variable is no longer significant. The sensibility of the subject-major variables to the 
introduction of new institutional variables illustrates the inter-relationship between faculty and 
subject fields. 
 
Introduction of a subjective resource indicator does not alter much of the faculty effect either. 
Neither scarce resources nor the staffs’ interest level have significant impact in any of the 
models. The only variable that matters is the one for heterogeneous student body (HSB). A one 
unit change in the HSB-variable is followed by an increase in the probability of overeducation 
of 23 percentage points from the mean together with a 7% reduction in average wage level. 
 
The results in Table 2 and 3 are consistent: the faculty level variables representing student 
composition has effect on the quality of the first job. Student resources are important, but we 
cannot conclude that financial or staff resources or staffs’ priorities affect graduates’ 
subsequent labour market outcomes. 
 
5.3 Alternative Estimation Procedures and Model Specifications 
of the Fixed-Effect Model 
5.3.1 Comparison Between Individual Level and Multilevel Analyses 
All models presented above are re-estimated by ordinary least square (OLS) or ordinary logit 
models at individual level, see Table A3-A4 in the Appendix. The results from the multilevel 
analyses are close to those observed at the individual level in terms of coefficient estimates, but 
the standard errors for the coefficients are generally smaller in the individual analyses. It is 
usually the case that the individual-level standard errors are underestimated because of the 
dependence among individuals within groups. In addition, the faculty-level variables are 
counted with the individual number of observations in the individual level analysis. As a 
consequence one would be more likely to conclude that an effect is statistically significant in 
an individual-level analysis, even though the magnitude of the coefficients are robust and 
generally similar to those obtained from the multilevel analysis (Ethington 1997, Raudenbush 
& Bryk 2002). This is especially the case with the faculty-level variables in our analyses. 
 
In the individual-level analysis with objective resource measures in Table A3, the student-staff 
ratio turns out to be significant in the job-probability model. In the individual-level analysis 
with subjective resource measures in Table A4, the indicator for uninterested staff is significant 
in the overeducation model and the indicator for scarce resources turns significant in the wage 
model. If we had based the analyses on ordinary logit-model or OLS at the individual level, we 
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might therefore have concluded that the student-staff ratio has a positive impact on the 
students' subsequent job probability (!); that students graduating from institutions where the 
academic staff is uninterested are associated with low probabilities of being overeducated (!); 
and that scarce resources within an institution have a positive effect on graduates earnings (!). 
All these results are contrary to the expectations. None of these results turned out to be 
significant in the multilevel analysis. We did not, on the other hand, find any significant results 
in the multilevel analysis that were not confirmed in the individual-level analysis. The results 
illustrate the major difference between the two analytic techniques and underline the necessity 
to base the different parts of the model estimations on the right level. 
 
5.3.2 Fixed-Effect Models Excluding Academic Performance 
It may be argued that grades should not be included among the independent individual 
variables in the model because academic performance is the outcome of education according to 
human capital theory. When we control for students academic performance, we may expect 
rather small effects of faculties, since the direct human capital effect on academic output is 
levelled out. Table A5 and A6 in the Appendix show the results of estimations without the 
grade variable included in the model. The effects are actually weakly affected by this change in 
the specification of the model. The impact of faculty variables seems to be robust across model 
specifications. Thus, we may conclude that grades do not remove an initial difference across 
faculties. We will therefore continue to include academic performance in the following 
analysis, because we – among other things – also want to investigate the relationship between 
institutional factors and individual performance. In addition, the wage models with grades 
included fits better than does the restricted model, tested by difference in deviance (significant 
at 1%-level by χ2, d.f.=2). 14 
 
5.3.3 Fixed-Effect Models with Job-Characteristics 
Our task is to estimate gross effects of education. As a consequence, no job-related variables 
are included in the model, since such factors may be regarded as outcomes in the labour 
market. At the same time, the educational institutions and the labour market represent two 
sides of an inter-dependent system. Institutional effects of education on labour market 
outcomes could be interpreted as at least partly structured by the labour market itself. There is 
always the possibility that statistical associations depict causality both ways, and even spurious 
relationships. Introduction of job-specific variables in the model may help to strip the statistical 
effects of institutions of potential external influences, but may at the same time remove 
important outcome effects. It is therefore an open question whether we should include job-
specific factors or not. In our main models, we chose to exclude such factors. In this section, 
we illustrate the implication of including job-specific variables in the overeducation model and 
the wage model. These models may visualise the content of the gross educational effects. In a 
thoroughly regulated labour market, job quality (skill-match and wage level) may be tied up to 
job-characteristics related to sector and contract. 
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We lack strong indicators of demand-side features on the labour market. Available variables 
are sector and contract form (permanent versus temporary contract, with research fellowship as 
an intermediate contract form with 3-4 years of fixed-term contract).15 In addition, variables for 
self-employed and part-time workers are included in the overeducation model, while these 
workers are not included in the wage model.16 
 
Table A7 and A8 in the Appendix display the results of the estimations with sector and the 
other job-specific variables included in the models. Both sector and contract form have impact 
on skills-mismatch and wages. Graduates working in private sector are more often 
overeducated than those in public sector, but the wage-level is also significantly higher in 
private sector. The temporary employed have higher probabilities of being overeducated and 
they receive lower wages than those engaged on permanent contracts (reference group). 
Research fellows also receive significantly lower wages than those on permanent contracts, and 
even though the coefficient of being overeducated is not significant (because of a small number 
of observations) the size of the coefficient is high and negative, implying that research fellows 
are rarely overeducated. Finally, part-time workers are more often overeducated than full-time 
workers. 
 
Controlling for sector may potentially explain some of the faculty effect of selectivity and 
student composition that we found in section 5.2, because of the important role of public sector 
in Norway and the differences in wages and skills-mismatch between sectors. But sector does 
not change the effect of selectivity and student composition. The coefficient estimates of 
selectivity in Table 2 and the heterogeneous-student-body (HSB)-variable in Table 3 are almost 
the same as in the comparable models in Table A7-A8 where sector is introduced. But when 
we include the other job-specific variables in addition, the effects of selectivity and student 
composition are roughly halved, but they are still significant in most model alternatives. 
 
Thus, we can conclude that the impact of selectivity and student composition cannot be 
explained by the allocation of graduates across public and private sector in the Norwegian 
labour market. On the other hand, about half of the effect can be traced back to the distribution 
of job contracts (temporary or permanent contracts, part-time or full-time jobs). Such job 
features can be viewed as important outcome variables in the labour market, and one should be 
careful to include such factors when estimating gross effects of education. 
 
5.4 Random Coefficient Models 
The results above are based on fixed-effect models. Here the intercept coefficient α1j is random 
across institutions, while the slopes β1j are constrained to have a common effect for all groups. 
                                                 
15  In our sample, 46% of the employed graduates report to work in the private sector, 49% in the public sector 
while the sector is unknown for the remaining 5%. 52% of the employed graduates work in permanent 
contracts, 40% are in temporary contracts while 5% are engaged as research fellows.  
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In this section, we will extend the analysis to random-coefficient models. In these models, the 
slopes are conceived as varying randomly across faculties. As we are primarily interested in 
gross effects of education, job characteristics will not be included in the models. 
 
 
Table 4: Alternative job, overeducation and wage model estimates. Multilevel analyses. 
 P(job) P(overeducation) 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Faculty data:           
Intercept -1.358 2.316 -1.492 2.305 -2.813 1.773 -2.712 1.773 -2.858 1.776 
HSB     1.081** 0.415 1.160*** 0.408 1.418*** 0.455 
Graduate data:           
Female 0.425** 0.183 0.560* 0.295 0.349** 0.148 0.371** 0.166 0.685** 0.281 
ln(age) 0.791 0.686 0.818 0.683 0.285 0.505 0.253 0.506 0.243 0.506 
Married/cohab. 0.414** 0.178 0.412** 0.180 -0.205 0.142 -0.203 0.142 -0.210 0.142 
Children 0.245 0.391 0.250 0.399 0.252 0.285 0.274 0.285 0.286 0.285 
Female*Children -1.158** 0.468 -1.125** 0.479 -0.289 0.381 -0.338 0.383 -0.348 0.383 
Mother higher ed. 0.071 0.188 0.069 0.190 -0.001 0.151 -0.002 0.152 -0.002 0.152 
Father higher ed. 0.137 0.184 0.117 0.186 -0.053 0.150 -0.058 0.150 -0.051 0.151 
Non western imm. -0.873** 0.410 -0.863** 0.415 -0.492 0.572 -0.510 0.574 -0.507 0.573 
Work experience 0.829*** 0.206 0.829*** 0.206 -0.857*** 0.158 -0.855*** 0.159 -0.853*** 0.159 
Additional educ. -0.166 0.207 -0.145 0.209 -0.173 0.177 -0.165 0.177 -0.170 0.177 
Grades (z-score) 0.132 0.085 0.131 0.087 -0.385*** 0.070 -0.388*** 0.070 -0.390*** 0.070 
Grades unknown -0.299 0.467 -0.344 0.480 0.406 0.432 0.425 0.432 0.430 0.431 
Social sciences 0.684* 0.361 0.780** 0.335 0.557* 0.301 0.520* 0.299 0.552* 0.305 
Law 0.216 0.375 0.321 0.314 0.678 0.428 0.509 0.421 0.601 0.435 
Natural sc.&Techn. 0.182 0.301 0.242 0.269 -0.406 0.306 -0.465 0.299 -0.477 0.308 
Health care sc. 0.214 0.348 0.296 0.331 -0.866* 0.482 -0.902* 0.482 -0.942* 0.493 
Primary ind. sc. 0.628 0.508 0.840* 0.474 0.078 0.405 0.072 0.394 0.038 0.405 
Business administ. 1.895*** 0.718 1.753*** 0.659 -0.455 0.667 -0.591 0.649 -0.495 0.674 
Random parts:           
Var[female]   1.298**   0.094*** 0.046*** 
Cross-level interaction:          
Female*HSB         -0.534 0.384 
Model statistics:           
Var between fac. 0.107* 0.368** 0.181*** 0.080*** 0.113*** 
N graduates 1887 1887 1707 1707 1707 
N faculties 34 34 34 34 34 
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Table 4 continues 
 ln(wage) 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Faculty data:         
Intercept 8.925*** 0.115 8.958*** 0.159 8.165*** 0.285 8.171*** 0.271 
Selectivity 0.016*** 0.003 0.016*** 0.003 0.149*** 0.044 0.145*** 0.042 
Graduate data:         
Female -0.036*** 0.009 -0.034*** 0.009 -0.034*** 0.009 -0.035*** 0.009 
ln(age) 0.291*** 0.033 0.281*** 0.047 0.520*** 0.084 0.517*** 0.080 
Married/cohabitant 0.021** 0.009 0.021** 0.009 0.021** 0.009 0.022** 0.009 
Children -0.016 0.018 -0.016 0.018 -0.014 0.018 -0.015 0.018 
Female*Children -0.016 0.025 -0.018 0.025 -0.020 0.025 -0.017 0.025 
Mother higher education 0.001 0.010 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.010 
Father higher education -0.006 0.010 -0.004 0.010 -0.005 0.010 -0.006 0.010 
Non western immigrants -0.052 0.032 -0.050 0.032 -0.047 0.032 -0.046 0.032 
Work experience 0.037*** 0.009 0.034*** 0.009 0.035*** 0.009 0.036*** 0.009 
Additional education 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.006 0.011 
Grades (z-score) 0.026*** 0.004 0.019*** 0.007 0.043** 0.017 0.050*** 0.013 
Grades unknown -0.028 0.031 -0.034 0.031 -0.030 0.031 -0.026 0.031 
Social sciences -0.010 0.020 -0.010 0.019 -0.007 0.019 -0.006 0.019 
Law 0.039 0.026 0.011 0.023 0.027 0.022 0.045** 0.023 
Natural sciences & Techn. 0.056** 0.022 0.048** 0.020 0.053*** 0.019 0.056*** 0.020 
Health care sciences 0.046* 0.024 0.053** 0.023 0.060*** 0.023 0.057** 0.023 
Primary industry sciences 0.000 0.028 -0.010 0.026 -0.004 0.026 -0.001 0.026 
Business administration 0.187*** 0.036 0.173*** 0.031 0.182*** 0.031 0.186*** 0.033 
Random parts:         
Var[ln(age)]   0.021*  0.003** 0.001 
Var[grades]   0.001***  0.0005***  
Cross-level interaction:         
ln(age)*Selectivity     -0.040*** 0.013 -0.039*** 0.013 
Grades*Selectivity     -0.004 0.002 -0.004** 0.002 
Model statistics:         
Var between graduates 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.022 
Var between faculties 0.001*** 0.225* 0.034** 0.013 
Deviance -1244 -1262 -1268 -1254 
Number of graduates 1294 1294 1294 1294 
Number of faculties 34 34 34 34 
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. – not available 
HSB: Heterogeneous student body. 
 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the estimations. The modelling process is based on a sequential 
procedure, where only significant faculty-level variables from the previous sections are 
retained. Then we insert a random slope on all significant level-1 variables, and keep the 
significant random parts. Finally, we include interaction-terms between faculty-level and 
graduate-level variables in order to explain the variation. 
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Model 0 is the fixed-effect models used as a starting point. No faculty-level variables are 
included in Model 0 for the job-probability because we did not find any of them significant 
above. Earlier we found significant effects of both the objective selectivity variable and the 
subjective HSB-measure in the estimation of overeducation and wages. When these two 
variables were introduced simultaneously, they performed rather weakly. As argued above, 
these two variables probably capture the same phenomenon, and they are highly correlated. For 
that reason, we chose only to include the best-performing variable in each model, ending up 
with the HSB-measure in the overeducation model and the selectivity variable in the wage 
model. The subjective measure gives the best prediction of skills-mismatch, while the objective 
measure is preferred in the wage model. 
 
In the next step the random coefficient models are introduced, by examining possible random 
slopes on all significant graduate level variables. The institutional level has a random impact 
on all three dependent variables, and the significant random slopes are included in Model 1. In 
the job-probability and the overeducation models, the gender-effect varies across faculties. In 
the wage model, the age-effect and the grade-effect differ significantly across faculties. These 
results suggest that there is considerable variation among faculties. Under the normality 
assumption, we would expect the gender-effects on the job log-odds ratio to fall within the 
range of (-1.37 , 2.49) for 90% of the faculties.17 Even if the structural parameter for the gender 
effect is significantly positive, there are individual faculties where the slope estimate is 
negative, implying that men from some faculties have higher job-probabilities than women 
from the same faculties, although the general picture is quite the opposite. Likewise, for 90% 
of the faculties we would expect the gender-effects on the overeducation log-odds ratio to fall 
within the range of (-0.15 , 0.89). Also in this case, individual faculties produce the opposite 
gender-effect than implied by the underlying structure. In terms of these models, equitable 
faculties would have weak differentiating gender effects, and it may come as no surprise that 
we find faculties where the gender-effect is around zero, meaning that male and female 
graduates face the same job-probabilities and probabilities of overeducation. 
 
Plausible values for faculty-specific effects in the wage model lies within the 90% range of 
(0.04 , 0.53) for the age-effect and (-0.03 , 0.07) for the grade-effect. Graduates’ wages can be 
expected to increase by age in nearly all faculties, since the value of zero is not included in the 
range. The grade effect varies from negative to positive values, however, implying that 
academic performance does not affect subsequent wages within all faculties. 
 
In the final step, Model 2 includes the remaining faculty-level variables as a possible 
explanation of the random slopes. This makes up to cross-level interaction-terms. In the 
overeducation model, the interaction-term between gender and HSB is not significant, even 
though the slope variance is nearly halved (from 0.094 to 0.046). In the wage model, the 
introduction of level interaction-terms reduces most of the variance in the age-slope (from 
0.021 to 0.003) and reduces the variance of the grade effect (from 0.001 to 0.0005). The 
                                                 
 28
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interaction-term between age and selectivity is negative and significant, implying that the 
selective faculties moderate the original age effect. The largest wage differences across age are 
then to be found in the least selective faculties, varying from an age-wage elasticity of nearly 
0.5 for non-selective faculties to 0.1 for high-selective faculties.18 Initially, graduates from the 
selective faculties have a wage premium, but the wage difference across selectivity is reduced 
as age increases, see Figure 1. Within 90% of the age distribution, however, the age-effect in 
the least selective faculties is not strong enough to fully close the gap. 
 
The interaction-term between grades and selectivity is not significant in Model 2, although it is 
close to p=0.1. This interaction term turns out significant in other model specifications 
however, e.g. in Model 3 where the grade-slope is fixed. In this case, also the interaction-term 
between grades and selectivity is significant. Thus, the results are mixed and depend on model 
specification.19 Based on the results from Model 3, we find that the selective faculties moderate 
the original grade effect. In non-selective faculties the grade-effect on wages is about (0.043-
1*0.004)≈4%, while the grade-effect in the average selective faculties is reduced to (0.043-
7.2*0.004)≈1½%. In high-selective faculties the grade effect is nullified (0.043-
10.51*0.004≈0). One explanation for this phenomenon could be the strong signalling effect of 
being admitted to the selective faculties, while the non-selective faculties use grades as the 
signalling device. Students are either tested in the beginning or at the end of the study. But the 
grade-effect in the least selective faculties is not strong enough to fully compensate for the 
initial wage difference between high-selective and non-selective faculties, not even for the best 
graduates, see Figure 2.  
 
                                                 
18  The selectivity-score for a (hypothetical) non-selective faculty where all applicants are admitted is 1, giving 
the age-effect: 0.52-1*0.04. High selectivity faculties are defined as faculties with a score 1SD above mean, 
that is (7.2+3.31)=10.51 from Table A1, giving the age-effect: 0.52-10.51*0.04. 
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grade level slope is very small in Model 2, it is highly significant. A deviance test between the two models 
also shows that Model 2 fits better than does Model 3 (χ2=14, df=4). 
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Figure 1: Illustration of the age-wage relationship across faculty selectivity 
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Note: Predicted wage from Model 2, Table 4, for average values on independent variables. The age distribution 
from 24-35 covers 90% of the sample. 
 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of the grade-wage relationship across faculty selectivity 
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Note: Predicted wage from Model 3, Table 4, for average values on independent variables 
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6 Discussion and conclusions 
Three main questions have been addressed in this paper. First, to what extent can institutions of 
HE explain graduates labour market outcome in terms of job probability, skill-mismatch and 
wages? We found that a moderate but not negligible part of the variation in graduates’ 
employment outcome is a function of between-faculty differences. Most of the variation can be 
linked to differences between graduates, and this points toward students as the primary actors 
in HE. But both institutional and individual aspects have explanatory power as well and should 
be included in a school-to-work transition analysis. 
 
The second question relates to how potential institutional effects work. Both traditional 
objective resource indicators and subjective assessment variables were introduced in the 
analyses. We did not find any impact of the faculty-level variables on graduates’ job 
probability. This result could be explained with reference to the favourable business cycle in 
the Norwegian labour market at the time of the survey (2000), offering plenty of job opportuni-
ties for the graduates. This is underlined by the fact that individual academic performance, in 
terms of grades, did not influence job probabilities either. However, as expected, academic 
performance affects skill-mismatch and wages. Not all vacancies are necessarily relevant for 
university graduates, and they queue up for the “good jobs” partly according to their academic 
performance. Thus, one could also expect that faculty resources contribute to explaining skill-
mismatch and wages. 
 
Both the objective and the subjective indicator of student composition, in terms of intake-
selectivity and heterogeneous-student-body measures, turned out to have an impact on the 
quality of the job. Other things being equal, graduates from the most selective and most 
homogenous faculties face the lowest risk of overeducation and the highest wages. One aspect 
of this interpretation is that professional interests can regulate wages through supply control in 
the labour market by introducing admission restrictions in the educational system. We did not 
find any impact of the allocation of financial or staff resources or the staffs’ priorities. Rather 
than contributing to additional evidence, the introduction of subjective assessment indicators 
confirm the estimated effects of the objective variables. The results are in line with earlier 
research on the importance of the composition of the student group. 
 
The third question raised is whether there is any interaction between institutional and 
individual effects. We found that faculty level has a random impact on all three dependent 
variables. In the job-probability and the overeducation models, the gender-effect varies 
systematically across faculties. In the wage model, the age-effect and the grade-effect differ 
across faculties. The age-wage effect across faculties can partly be explained by intake 
selectivity, in the sense that the least selective faculties are associated with the strongest age-
effect. In other words, the most selective faculties are also the most equitable faculties across 
age-cohorts. We also found some evidence pointing towards the same between-faculty 
variation on the grade-effect, namely that the least selective faculties are associated with the 
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strongest grade-effect. The statistical significance of this result is sensitive to model 
specification though, but taking the evidences at face value, it suggests that students are 
effectively tested one time or another. In the selective faculties they are tested at intake, in the 
less selective faculties they are tested at final exams. 
 
The unambiguous effect of selectivity and student composition can be explained in different 
ways. First, it could be a pure selection effect where students are allocated across faculties 
according to innate abilities. Second, it could be that the best faculties attract the most able 
students, thus being a combination of individual selectivity and institutional effect. Third, 
selectivity may produce a motivation effect, contributing to self-confidence and extra effort 
among the “chosen” students. And forth, the most selective institutions have the most 
homogeneous student bodies, and this may in some circumstances produce advantageous 
teaching and learning conditions. None of these explanations can be ruled out. The observed 
effects of selectivity and student composition result from combinations of all four factors. 
 
These explanations illustrate the interdependence between institutions and students. In this 
paper, we have taken explicit account of the institutional and the individual level in common 
models. We have demonstrated that the multilevel techniques used in this study prevent us 
from drawing fallacious conclusions arising in simple individual-level analysis. However, 
although the multilevel techniques are powerful, the study is not without limitations. The most 
serious problem is probably the lack of individual intake ability scores. This shortage is partly 
compensated for by collective student-composition measures and by measures of academic 
performance through grades. 
 
Even though academic performance may capture important aspects of individual heterogeneity 
among graduates, it could be discussed whether grades should be included as an explanatory 
variable in a model built on an education production function relationship. According to human 
capital theory, academic performance is the outcome of education and should not be included 
among the explanatory variables. We have documented that the results do not depend on 
whether grades are included in the model or not. Therefore we chose to include academic 
performance (grades) in the model in order to investigate the relationship between institutional 
factors and individual performance. If we had excluded grades from the model, we would not 
have been able to analyse the relationship between grades and selectivity. 
 
Our aim has been to estimate gross effects of education. Thus, job-specific variables are not 
included in our preferred models, because such aspects may be regarded as outcome in the 
labour market. At the same time, labour market outcomes could be a result of labour market 
structure. The educational system and the labour market system are two sides of an inter-
dependent structure. For these reasons, we have also included job-specific variables in 
alternative estimations. The effect of selectivity and student composition is not changed by 
including sector in the analyses. Aspects of the job contract, such as temporary or permanent 
contract and part or full time employment, explains about half of the faculty effect of 
selectivity and student composition. But one should be careful holding such job characteristics 
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constant in a model estimating gross effects of education. The reason for this is that such 
factors are likely to be an integral part of the labour-market outcome that we try to explain. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Data source and means of all variables, standard deviation of continuous variables  
  
Data source 
 
Total sample 
Subsample of 
employed 
Subsample of full- 
time wage earners 
  Mean (SD) 1 Mean (SD) 1 Mean (SD) 1 
Dependent variables: NGS       
Job  0.90  –  –  
Overeducation  –  0.19  0.16  
Wage (full-time wage in NOK)  –  –  23083 (4051) 
        
Independent graduate variables: NGS       
Female  0.54  0.55  0.53  
Age (years)  29.2 (5.9) 29.2 (6.0) 28.9 (5.6) 
Married/cohabitant  0.55  0.55  0.55  
Children  0.13  0.14  0.13  
Mother higher education  0.43  0.44  0.44  
Father higher education  0.55  0.55  0.54  
Non western immigrant  0.02  0.02  0.02  
Work experience  0.37  0.39  0.39  
Additional education  0.23  0.23  0.23  
Grade level (z-score)  0.00 (0.98) 0.01 (0.99) 0.04 (0.99) 
Grade level unknown  0.02  0.02  0.02  
Humanities  0.17  0.17  0.15  
Social sciences  0.15  0.16  0.15  
Law  0.16  0.16  0.17  
Natural sciences & Technology  0.28  0.27  0.29  
Health care sciences  0.12  0.12  0.10  
Primary industry sciences  0.06  0.06  0.07  
Business administration  0.05  0.06  0.07  
Number of observations  1887  1707  1294  
        
Independent faculty variables:   Mean (SD)    
Objective measures:        
Student-staff ratio Register (DBH / RPR) 21.46 (19.92)    
Selectivity (searchers/admitted) Register (DBH) 7.20 (3.31)    
Expenditure per student (1000NOK) Register (ND / DBH) 106.9 (76.9)    
Subjective measures:       
Scarce resources NUS  0.84 (0.37)    
Heterogeneous student body (HSB) NUS  0.41 (0.49)    
Uninterested staff NUS  -0.23 (0.24)    
Number of observations   34     
NGS: NIFU Graduate Survey 2000. NUS: NIFU University Survey 2000. DBH: The Norwegian Database on 
Higher Education. RPR: NIFU Research Personnel Register. ND: NIFU Database on resources and expenditures 
in higher education in Norway. 
 – not available 
Note 1: SD of a dummy variable is a function the estimated probability and thus superfluous to display. 
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Table A2: Correlations between faculty level resource variables (N=34) 
 Student-staff 
ratio 
Selectivity Expenditure 
per student 
Scarce 
resources 
Heterogeneous 
student body 
Uninterested 
staff 
Student-staff  
  ratio 
1      
Selectivity 
 
-0.25 
(0.15) 
1     
Expenditure 
  per student  
-0.57 
(0.00) 
0.68 
(0.00) 
1    
Scarce resources 
 
0.08 
(0.67) 
0.08 
(0.65) 
0.18 
(0.30) 
1   
Heterogeneous  
  student body 
-0.07 
(0.70) 
-0.52 
(0.00) 
-0.33 
(0.05) 
0.12 
(0.48) 
1  
Uninterested 
  staff 
0.37 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.74) 
-0.03 
(0.86) 
0.04 
(0.83) 
-0.21 
(0.23) 
1 
Significance level in brackets 
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Table A3: Job, overeducation and wage model estimates with objective resource measures. 
Individual level analyses: Ordinary logit models (on job and overeducation) and ordinary least 
square (on wages) 
          P[job] P[overeducation]        ln(wage) 
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Student-staff ratio 0.020* 0.011 -0.007 0.009 0.001 0.001 
Selectivity 0.020 0.045 -0.101** 0.045 0.017*** 0.003 
Expenditure per student -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Female 0.470** 0.182 0.355** 0.146 -0.038*** 0.009 
ln(age) 0.733 0.688 0.015 0.500 0.289*** 0.033 
Married/cohabitant 0.385** 0.177 -0.196 0.141 0.021** 0.009 
Children 0.329 0.393 0.219 0.285 -0.018 0.019 
Female*Children -1.262*** 0.470 -0.227 0.379 -0.016 0.026 
Mother higher education 0.062 0.187 -0.014 0.150 0.002 0.010 
Father higher education 0.128 0.184 -0.058 0.149 -0.005 0.010 
Non western immigrant -0.916** 0.408 -0.608 0.571 -0.049 0.033 
Work experience 0.837*** 0.205 -0.879*** 0.158 0.036*** 0.009 
Additional education -0.190 0.206 -0.149 0.175 0.009 0.011 
Grade level (z-score) 0.127 0.085 -0.362*** 0.069 0.026*** 0.004 
Grade level unknown -0.248 0.469 0.403 0.432 -0.032 0.032 
Social sciences 0.437 0.342 0.350 0.237 -0.027 0.017 
Law -1.279* 0.755 0.800 0.603 -0.031 0.040 
Natural sciences & Technology 0.259 0.261 -0.319 0.239 0.054*** 0.016 
Health care sciences 0.250 0.431 -1.511*** 0.495 0.044** 0.021 
Primary industry sciences 0.985** 0.457 0.162 0.319 -0.026 0.022 
Business administration 1.570** 0.643 -1.155** 0.450 0.160*** 0.022 
Intercept -1.519 2.362 -0.632 1.737 8.926*** 0.114 
Model statistics:       
R2-adj. – – 0.205 
-2 log likelihood 1111.485 1503.540 – 
Number of observations 1887 1707 1294 
Note: * p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. – not available 
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Table A4: Job, overeducation and wage model estimates with subjective resource measures. 
Individual level analyses: Ordinary logit models (on job and overeducation) and ordinary least 
square (on wages) 
          P[job] P[overeducation]       ln(wage) 
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
       
Scarce resources 0.107 0.306 -0.082 0.298 0.037** 0.018 
Heterogeneous student body  0.169 0.313 0.919*** 0.342 -0.082*** 0.018 
Uninterested staff -0.271 0.480 -0.819** 0.410 0.005 0.027 
Female 0.448** 0.182 0.351** 0.146 -0.037*** 0.009 
ln(age) 0.862 0.686 0.399 0.500 0.264*** 0.033 
Married/cohabitant 0.406** 0.177 -0.172 0.141 0.020** 0.009 
Children 0.259 0.391 0.244 0.284 -0.021 0.019 
Female*Children -1.174** 0.467 -0.268 0.378 -0.015 0.026 
Mother higher education 0.066 0.187 -0.003 0.151 0.002 0.010 
Father higher education 0.129 0.184 -0.049 0.149 -0.004 0.010 
Non western immigrant -0.892** 0.408 -0.498 0.568 -0.054 0.033 
Work experience 0.843*** 0.206 -0.848*** 0.158 0.030*** 0.009 
Additional education -0.171 0.206 -0.165 0.175 0.010 0.011 
Grade level (z-score) 0.133 0.085 -0.370*** 0.069 0.026*** 0.004 
Grade level unknown -0.299 0.466 0.394 0.431 -0.021 0.032 
Social sciences 0.858 0.346 0.415* 0.240 -0.006 0.017 
Law 0.391** 0.384 0.942*** 0.349 0.004 0.021 
Natural sciences & Technology 0.247 0.274 -0.359 0.235 0.096*** 0.016 
Health care sciences 0.357 0.401 -1.017** 0.428 0.055** 0.021 
Primary industry sciences 0.781* 0.461 -0.057 0.306 0.018 0.022 
Business administration 1.999*** 0.667 -0.641 0.497 0.150*** 0.024 
Intercept -1.880 2.382 -3.228* 1.782 9.116*** 0.117 
Model statistics:       
R2-adj. – – 0.190 
-2 log likelihood 1116.548 1497.719 – 
Number of observations 1887 1707 1294 
Note: * p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. – not available 
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Table A5: Job, overeducation and wage model estimates with objective resource measures. 
Multilevel analyses. 
          P[job] P[overeducation]       ln(wage) 
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Faculty level data:       
Intercept -0.869 2.310 -2.741 1.701 9.058*** 0.115 
Student-staff ratio 0.021 0.013 -0.006 0.011 0.000 0.001 
Selectivity 0.021 0.054 -0.114* 0.061 0.017*** 0.004 
Expenditure per student -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Graduate level data:       
Female 0.431** 0.183 0.371** 0.146 -0.038*** 0.009 
ln(age) 0.529 0.669 0.642 0.483 0.253*** 0.033 
Married/cohabitant 0.424** 0.177 -0.242* 0.140 0.023** 0.009 
Children 0.282 0.393 0.257 0.283 -0.020 0.018 
Female*Children -1.221** 0.470 -0.300 0.377 -0.013 0.026 
Mother higher education 0.081 0.188 -0.026 0.151 0.003 0.010 
Father higher education 0.152 0.185 -0.081 0.149 -0.006 0.010 
Non western immigrant -0.931** 0.408 -0.336 0.562 -0.068** 0.033 
Work experience 0.850*** 0.206 -0.923*** 0.157 0.041*** 0.009 
Additional education -0.180 0.206 -0.190 0.175 0.009 0.011 
Social sciences 0.424 0.382 0.535* 0.305 -0.016 0.021 
Law -1.291 0.877 0.761 0.701 0.018 0.045 
Natural sciences & Technology 0.234 0.319 -0.099 0.329 0.052** 0.021 
Health care sciences 0.350 0.475 -1.227** 0.526 0.052** 0.025 
Primary industry sciences 0.733 0.517 0.419 0.418 -0.007 0.027 
Business administration 1.594** 0.731 -0.710 0.611 0.165*** 0.034 
Model statistics:       
Variance between graduates – – 0.023 
Variance between faculty 0.104 0.168*** 0.001*** 
Deviance – – -1209 
Number of graduates 1887 1707 1294 
Number of faculties 34 34 34 
0.003 
Note: * p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. – not available 
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Table A6: Job, overeducation and wage model estimates with subjective resource measures. 
Multilevel analyses. 
          P[job] P[overeducation]       ln(wage) 
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Faculty level data:       
Intercept -0.750 2.343 -4.883** 1.766 9.165*** 0.119 
Scarce resources -0.012 0.389 0.017 0.391 0.031 0.027 
Heterogeneous student body  0.008 0.379 0.965** 0.414 -0.067** 0.026 
Uninterested staff -0.237 0.599 -0.836 0.559 0.000 0.042 
Graduate level data:       
Female 0.408** 0.183 0.375** 0.146 -0.037*** 0.009 
ln(age) 0.578 0.669 0.850* 0.485 0.246*** 0.033 
Married/cohabitant 0.445** 0.178 -0.229 0.140 0.022** 0.009 
Children 0.217 0.392 0.273 0.283 -0.021 0.018 
Female*Children -1.140** 0.468 -0.323 0.377 -0.014 0.026 
Mother higher education 0.086 0.188 -0.024 0.151 0.003 0.010 
Father higher education 0.150 0.185 -0.079 0.149 -0.005 0.010 
Non western immigrant -0.917** 0.408 -0.293 0.561 -0.070** 0.033 
Work experience 0.848*** 0.206 -0.904*** 0.157 0.039*** 0.009 
Additional education -0.163 0.207 -0.197 0.175 0.008 0.011 
Social sciences 0.684* 0.404 0.657** 0.307 -0.005 0.023 
Law 0.306 0.514 0.957** 0.469 0.035 0.033 
Natural sciences & Technology 0.189 0.342 -0.177 0.305 0.095*** 0.024 
Health care sciences 0.274 0.466 -0.846* 0.477 0.066** 0.027 
Primary industry sciences 0.578 0.542 0.333 0.399 0.035 0.030 
Business administration 1.930** 0.799 -0.263 0.640 0.168*** 0.043 
Model statistics:       
Variance between graduates – – 0.023 
Variance between faculty 0.167** 0.142*** 0.001*** 
Deviance – – -1195 
Number of graduates 1887 1707 1294 
Number of faculties 34 34 34 
Note: * p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. – not available 
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Table A7: Overeducation and wage level model estimates with objective resource measures 
and job-specific variables included. Multilevel analyses. 
 P(Overeducation) P(Overeducation)       ln(wage)        ln(wage) 
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Faculty data:         
Intercept -2.270 1.833 -3.961** 1.923 8.841*** 0.113 9.116*** 0.107 
Student-staff ratio -0.006 0.012 -0.011 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Selectivity -0.152** 0.065 -0.072 0.048 0.016*** 0.003 0.010*** 0.003 
Expenditure per student 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Graduate data:         
Female 0.406*** 0.151 0.286* 0.158 -0.032*** 0.009 -0.023*** 0.009 
ln(age) 0.458 0.521 0.633 0.551 0.308*** 0.032 0.252*** 0.030 
Married/cohabitant -0.234 0.145 -0.178 0.151 0.021** 0.009 0.013 0.008 
Children 0.231 0.294 0.276 0.307 -0.014 0.018 -0.014 0.017 
Female*Children -0.311 0.392 -0.561 0.411 -0.017 0.025 -0.017 0.023 
Mother higher education -0.027 0.155 -0.082 0.162 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.009 
Father higher education -0.033 0.153 -0.093 0.159 -0.004 0.009 0.000 0.009 
Non western immigrants -0.433 0.580 -0.478 0.587 -0.049 0.032 -0.046 0.030 
Work experience -0.908*** 0.161 -0.857*** 0.167 0.035*** 0.009 0.030*** 0.009 
Additional education -0.133 0.181 -0.105 0.188 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.010 
Grades (z-score) -0.384*** 0.072 -0.285*** 0.075 0.026*** 0.004 0.023*** 0.004 
Grades unknown 0.560 0.444 0.475 0.476 -0.025 0.031 -0.024 0.029 
Social sciences 0.396 0.329 0.361 0.260 -0.024 0.020 -0.020 0.017 
Law 0.599 0.769 0.859 0.670 -0.009 0.043 -0.026 0.038 
Natural sciences & Techn. -0.296 0.358 -0.145 0.261 0.040** 0.020 0.041** 0.016 
Health care sciences -1.125** 0.549 -1.281** 0.512 0.051** 0.024 0.051** 0.020 
Primary industry sciences 0.022 0.448 0.057 0.350 -0.023 0.026 -0.017 0.022 
Business administration -1.262* 0.663 -0.972** 0.471 0.133*** 0.033 0.091*** 0.025 
Private sector 0.921*** 0.142 1.287*** 0.161 0.075*** 0.009 0.034*** 0.009 
Sector unknown -0.780* 0.399 -0.426 0.432 0.035 0.039 0.019 0.037 
Temporary employment   1.116*** 0.163   -0.113*** 0.009 
Research fellow   -1.210 0.738   -0.105*** 0.018 
Self employed   0.046 0.476     
Part time worker   1.181*** 0.181     
Model statistics:         
Var between graduates – – 0.021 0.019 
Var between faculties 0.230*** 0.001** 0.0006*** 0.0002** 
Deviance – – -1317 -1469 
Number of graduates 1707 1707 1294 1294 
Number of faculties 34 34 34 34 
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. – not available 
 43
NIFU skriftserie nr. 27/2003 – Measuring the Relationship Between Resources and Outcomes in Higher Education in Norway 
 44
Table A8: Overeducation and wage level model estimates with subjective resource measures 
and job-specific variables included. Multilevel analyses. 
 P(Overeducation) P(Overeducation)        ln(wage)         ln(wage) 
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Faculty data:         
Intercept -4.348** 1.885 -5.977*** 1.980 8.959*** 0.116 9.243*** 0.108 
Scarce resources -0.212 0.426 -0.140 0.335 0.042* 0.024 0.027 0.018 
HSB  1.127** 0.459 0.652* 0.378 -0.085*** 0.023 -0.061*** 0.018 
Uninterested staff -0.580 0.627 -0.710 0.462 0.016 0.038 0.030 0.028 
Graduate data:         
Female 0.405*** 0.151 0.278* 0.157 -0.030*** 0.009 -0.022** 0.009 
ln(age) 0.642 0.518 0.904 0.552 0.301*** 0.032 0.240*** 0.030 
Married/cohabitant -0.217 0.145 -0.156 0.151 0.021** 0.009 0.012 0.008 
Children 0.260 0.292 0.310 0.305 -0.015 0.018 -0.015 0.017 
Female*Children -0.345 0.391 -0.593 0.410 -0.018 0.025 -0.017 0.023 
Mother higher education -0.023 0.155 -0.071 0.162 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.009 
Father higher education -0.035 0.153 -0.094 0.160 -0.003 0.009 0.001 0.009 
Non western immigrants -0.423 0.579 -0.457 0.589 -0.049 0.032 -0.047 0.030 
Work experience -0.888*** 0.161 -0.843*** 0.167 0.032*** 0.009 0.027*** 0.009 
Additional education -0.143 0.180 -0.116 0.188 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 
Grades (z-score) -0.388*** 0.072 -0.290*** 0.076 0.027*** 0.004 0.023*** 0.004 
Grades unknown 0.528 0.442 0.407 0.472 -0.016 0.031 -0.015 0.029 
Social sciences 0.457 0.333 0.368 0.272 -0.017 0.021 -0.010 0.017 
Law 0.715 0.526 0.728* 0.398 -0.004 0.030 -0.005 0.022 
Natural sciences & Techn. -0.540 0.339 -0.183 0.265 0.084*** 0.021 0.068*** 0.016 
Health care sciences -0.882* 0.504 -1.084** 0.461 0.054** 0.025 0.053** 0.021 
Primary industry sciences -0.168 0.438 -0.083 0.347 0.015 0.028 0.009 0.022 
Business administration -0.823 0.710 -0.597 0.541 0.121*** 0.039 0.076*** 0.027 
Private sector 0.888*** 0.142 1.260*** 0.162 0.078*** 0.009 0.038*** 0.009 
Sector unknown -0.761* 0.398 -0.362 0.429 0.026 0.039 0.011 0.037 
Temporary employment   1.147*** 0.162   -0.115*** 0.009 
Research fellow   -1.164 0.739   -0.109*** 0.018 
Self employed   0.020 0.472     
Part time worker   1.152*** 0.182     
Model statistics:         
Var between graduates – – 0.021 0.019 
Var between faculties 0.220*** 0.012*** 0.0009*** 0.0002*** 
Deviance – – -1308 -1462 
Number of graduates 1707 1707 1294 1294 
Number of faculties 34 34 34 34 
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. – not available 
